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Egocentric? Reinterpreting Evidence
for Allocentric, Object-Centered, or
World-Centered Reference Frames
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1 Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany, 2 Berlin School of Mind
and Brain, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
The use and neural representation of egocentric spatial reference frames is
well-documented. In contrast, whether the brain represents spatial relationships between
objects in allocentric, object-centered, or world-centered coordinates is debated. Here,
I review behavioral, neuropsychological, neurophysiological (neuronal recording), and
neuroimaging evidence for and against allocentric, object-centered, or world-centered
spatial reference frames. Based on theoretical considerations, simulations, and empirical
findings from spatial navigation, spatial judgments, and goal-directed movements, I
suggest that all spatial representations may in fact be dependent on egocentric reference
frames.
Keywords: allocentric, object-centered, egocentric, spatial reference frames, parietal sensorimotor
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INTRODUCTION
Do animals use spatial reference frames that are independent of an egocentric viewpoint? In
other words, does the brain represent map-like spatial layouts, or spatial locations of objects
and landmarks, in an allocentric, or “other-centered” spatial reference frame, independent of the
ego’s perspective or location? Does the choice of spatial reference frame depend on (passive)
perception vs. sensorimotor interactions with the environment, such as target-directed movements
or navigation?
It is well-established that neurons in many brain regions, especially parieto-frontal cortex,
represent the spatial location of objects in egocentric spatial reference frames, centered on various
body parts such as the eye (retina), the head, or the hand (Colby, 1998; Hagler et al., 2007; Sereno
and Huang, 2014). However, whether the brain also represents spatial locations of external objects
relative to other objects in an allocentric or object-centered spatial reference frame, or constructs
an abstract map of such relationships that is independent of the egocentric perspective, is debated
(Bennett, 1996; Driver and Pouget, 2000; Wang and Spelke, 2002; Burgess, 2006; Wehner et al.,
2006; Rorden et al., 2012; Li et al., 2014).
Here, I review empirical (behavioral, neuropsychological, neurophysiological, and
neuroimaging) evidence for and against allocentric vs. egocentric spatial representations.
In addition, I discuss theoretical considerations and computational models addressing this
distinction.
Based on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence, I suggest that object-centered,
allocentric, or world-centered spatial representations may be explained via egocentric spatial
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reference frames. I shall argue that allocentric task effects could
alternatively be explained via the following processes:
(1) mentally shifting (translating, rotating) an object, thereby
lining it up with the egocentric midline (or fovea), such that
the object’s left (right) and the ego’s left (right) are equivalent.
Spatial decisions regarding where targets are relative to the
object are thus translated into egocentric left/right decisions
(ego-relative remapping);
(2) mental transformations of the ego (e.g., mental rotation
or translation of the ego into a new imagined orientation
or position, then referencing the location of objects and
landmarks to this new, mentally transformed, egocentric
position);
(3) rule-based decision making; for instance, prefrontal top-
down control is exerted on a number of brain regions,
including on sensorimotor parieto-frontal areas (e.g.,
top-down inputs from dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to
supplementary eye fields or posterior parietal regions such
as areas LIP or 7a). Here, rather than using an allocentric
spatial reference frame to represent spatial locations, neurons
appear to learn to respond categorically in a learned, rule-
based fashion, not because of bottom-up construction of an
allocentric spatial reference frame based on visual input, but
because of categorical signals from prefrontal cortex. This
rule-based response only emerges after training, in contrast
to, e.g., bottom-up retinotopic representations;
(4) object, landmark, or scene recognition, whereby an object,
landmark, or scene has been encoded from one or
multiple (egocentric) viewpoints (e.g., by medial temporal
lobe memory networks). View-dependent object or scene
recognition then predominantly activates the ventral, rather
than dorsal, visual stream, as well as hippocampal and related
structures, depending on the task.
The latter point suggests that landmark or scene recognition via
viewpoint-matching is more akin to object recognition than a
spatial representation of object coordinates and locations relative
to an external, environment-based reference frame. As such,
the brain might not rely on allocentric spatial reference frames
either for spatial judgments in spatial perception, or during
navigation, or in sensorimotor transformations for goal-directed
movements (e.g., grasping, pointing, or eye movements) toward
external objects. Thus, I will argue that neither the way we encode
space, nor the way we interact with space, need make use of
allocentric spatial reference frames independent of egocentric
representations. Object-based representations do exist, especially
in the ventral visual stream, but are not spatial in the sense of
referring locations external to the viewer to another external
object. Ventral object-centered representations are essentially
akin to object recognition, with spatial decisions remaining
anchored to a fundamentally egocentric spatial reference frame.
I will commence with some theoretical examples for why it
is difficult if not impossible to relate spatial locations (whether
left or right, up or down, or simply “the center of”) to
external, non-egocentric coordinates. I will then review empirical
evidence for different spatial reference frames in navigation,
spatial judgments, and goal-directed movements (interactions
with spatial targets), as well as computational (simulation)
explanations for the effects observed. By attempting to unify
a wide range of findings from multiple research areas, this
review will necessarily not be fully comprehensive within each
domain, but will instead highlight representative studies. Finally,
I will conclude with a new suggested categorization of networks
contributing to spatial processing, as well as with several
predictions made by the egocentric account.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: CAN
SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS BE
INDEPENDENT OF THE EGOCENTRIC
PERSPECTIVE OR POSITION?
Different definitions have been used to define the term
“allocentric.” Klatzky (1998), for instance, distinguishes between
three “functional modules”: egocentric locational representation,
allocentric locational representation, and allocentric heading.
Whereas egocentric locational representations reference
locations of objects to the observer (ego), allocentric
representations reference object locations to space external
to the perceiver. For instance, positions could be represented
in Cartesian or Polar coordinates with the origin centered
on an external reference object (Klatzky, 1998). Allocentric
heading, on the other hand, defines the angle between an object’s
axis of orientation and an external reference direction. Other
authors have proposed distinctions between “allocentric” and
“object-centered” representations (e.g., Humphreys et al., 2013).
Although different authors have used the terms “allocentric,”
“object-centered,” or “world-centered” in many different ways,
the majority of the spatial cognition literature has used these
terms to refer to representations of spatial relationships between
objects or landmarks that do not reference objects’ locations to
the viewer’s body, but to other, external objects (Foley et al., 2015).
Here, I shall refer to “allocentric,” “object-centered,” “object-
based,” “object-relative,” “world-centered,” or “cognitive map-
like” interchangeably, to refer to the representation of the spatial
location of an object relative to that of another external object,
independent of the ego’s position or orientation, whether present,
imagined, or remembered. This is equivalent to Klatzky’s (1998)
allocentric locational representation.
In contrast, I shall refer to “egocentric” or “ego-relative” spatial
reference frames whenever the observer invokes the position
or orientation of the present, remembered, or imagined (e.g.,
mentally rotated or translated) self, as opposed to an external
landmark, to represent the location of external objects.
A spatial reference frame means the receptive field (RF) of a
neuron, or the response of the neural population as a whole, is
anchored to a particular reference point. For instance, an eye-
centered reference frame moves with the eyes (Colby, 1998). A
cell preferring stimulation in the left visual field only signals
objects when they fall in that cell’s RF, which is anchored to the
retina. As the eyes move across the visual field, objects’ spatial
locations change constantly relative to the retina (e.g., an object
“left of the eyes” can suddenly be “right of the eyes”). Objects’
spatial locations are thus constantly updated such that different
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eye-centered cells, with spatial RFs tiling the visual space, signal
the new eye-centered location. An external, “abstract” reference
frame, on the other hand, would represent object locations
relative to an external reference point, independent of where the
observer is (e.g., the location of the microwave relative to the
fridge).
For the purpose of this paper it is irrelevant whether neurons
with similar reference frames are arranged in amap of space, such
as a retinotopic map of space where cells with similar preferences
(e.g., “left half of space”) are clustered together. Cells can be eye-
centered and yet be part of either an orderly retinotopic map
or a scrambled map of space, with neighboring eye-centered
cells having retinal response fields in different locations (Filimon,
2010). I also do not distinguish between reference frames or maps
of space represented at the single cell or population level—e.g.,
the entire population may signal “left of me,” but individual cells’
responses may be less clear-cut. The important point addressed
here is whether any neural representations, at the single-cell or
population level, explicitly signal spatial relationships between
objects independent of their spatial location relative to the ego,
i.e., whether an explicit object-centered or allocentric spatial
representation is formed at whichever computational stage of
processing. As defined by Deneve and Pouget (2003), an explicit
representation would involve neurons with invariant responses
in object-centered coordinates—e.g., the cell should only respond
to “left of object,” regardless of where the object is relative to the
ego.
Klatzky (1998) also made the distinction between primitive
parameters conveyed by a spatial representation and derived
parameters which can be computed from primitives in one
or more computational steps. Thus, allocentric location is a
primitive parameter in an allocentric locational representation,
just like egocentric location is a primitive in the egocentric
locational representation (Klatzky, 1998). However, I will review
evidence that suggests that allocentric location representations
are unlikely to be primitives, but are instead derived from
egocentric representations at higher levels of the computational
hierarchy, and may not be represented explicitly.
Figure 1 shows several examples of spatial arrangements that
would at first instance appear to be object-based, allocentric
spatial relationships. For instance, one could refer to left/right
terminology to describe the spatial location of a window relative
to a door.
In Figure 1A (left) one could argue that the window is “left
of the door” and the door is “right of the window,” regardless of
whether the observer is located left of the house (where both the
window and the door are on the egocentric right) or to the right
of the house (where both objects are on the egocentric left). The
fact that the window is “left” of another object, even though it
is egocentrically on the right, could be interpreted as an object-
centered, ego-independent spatial representation. However, as
can be seen in Figure 1A (right), this arrangement is nevertheless
dependent on the egocentric viewpoint. Once the observer has
walked inside the house, viewing the door and window from the
inside, the left–right relationship is reversed: now the window
is to the right of the door and the door is to the left of the
window. This example demonstrates the ego-dependence of
FIGURE 1 | Example scenarios in which so-called allocentric spatial
representations in fact depend on the egocentric viewpoint. (A)
Left–right relationships. The window may be defined as “left of the door” (left).
However, this only holds when viewing the door and the window from outside
the house; when stepping inside the house (right), the window is now “right of
the door,” lining up with the egocentric left and right. (B) Center-of-object
spatial decisions. The center or middle point of a wall (or bar) is easily
perceived when the ego is positioned perpendicular to the wall, in front of that
center (left). When viewed from the side, however (right), the center point of the
wall is harder to determine, because the egocentric perspective distorts the
image of the wall on the retina. (C) Relative alignment between two objects.
The alignment between the minute hand and the individual minute lines (left)
suggests the time is 12:25. From a different (egocentric) viewpoint, however,
this so-called allocentric spatial relationship shifts, with the new perspective
indicating 12:26. (D) Proximity (closest to landmark) relationships. Out of two
identical-looking square keys, the square key next to the little round key is the
one we want. Here, the target square key can be identified independent of the
viewer’s viewpoint. However, this resembles object recognition with the square
and round key forming one unit, followed by rule-based decision making: first
identify the little round key, then find the square key closest to it. This seems
less like a spatial representation than object recognition.
“left” and “right” spatial judgments. The observer merely has
to imagine the house aligned with the egocentric center point,
such that the house’s left (right) and the egocentric left (right)
are congruent. Such imagined rotation or imagined translation
that transforms the ego’s orientation or position relative to an
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object, or conversely the position of an object relative to the
ego, has been called imaginal updating (Klatzky, 1998). Since the
definition of left and right depends on the egocentric perspective,
this definition of left/right relative to the object (the house or
any landmark on it) is not an example of true allocentric or
object-centered (ego-independent) spatial representations.
Figure 1B demonstrates another possible way of
conceptualizing object-centered spatial representations. Instead
of using spatial judgment terms such as “left” and “right,” which
appear tied to egocentric perspectives, one could use “center
of an object.” Clearly something that is in the center of an
object should remain in the center of the object regardless
of whether the observer is in front or behind that object.
However, as Figure 1B demonstrates, establishing the center
point of, e.g., a wall, remains dependent of the egocentric
perspective: as soon as the observer is positioned at one end
of the object (e.g., at the left end of the wall), the distorted
retinal perspective obtained from that (egocentric) location
makes it much harder to determine where the center point of
the wall is. This may not apply to small objects that can be
foveated. However, for small objects (which can be mentally
shifted to line up with the fovea), the egocentric left/right and
the object’s left/right are congruent, and the center point can be
estimated based on retinal extent. Alternatively, small objects
may be treated as a point in space. As explained above, the
critical test for an allocentric representation is independence of
object locations from any egocentric perspective, thus relying on
abstract spatial relationships between objects independent of the
observer.
Avoiding “left/right” and “center of” terminology, one might
devise a stimulus (Figure 1C) where the relative spatial alignment
of two objects is what matters (e.g., the alignment on a clock
between the minutes hand and the minute mark corresponding
to 25min). Does the clock indicate 25min past the hour? As
Figure 1C (right) demonstrates, this depends on the egocentric
perspective: viewed from the side, the alignment between the
minute hand and the twenty-fifth minute mark appears shifted
such that one is unsure if the time is 12:25 or 12:26. Thus, even
relative spatial alignment between two objects does not appear
ego-independent.
Finally, ignoring examples that rely on absolute spatial
location (either left or right of center, estimating the center
based on distance from the edge, or detecting alignment based
on distance between two objects), what about spatial proximity?
Figure 1D shows two square keys that appear identical. One of
the square keys is located next to a little round key. One can
argue that no matter what egocentric perspective one assumes
(no matter how the keys are rotated on the key chain), the
square key in question will always be closer to the little round
key than the other square key. Therefore, this should constitute
an allocentric, ego-independent spatial representation. However,
rather than involving spatial cognition, this example may rely
on object recognition followed by rule-based reasoning: identify
the little key first, then take the square key next to it (regardless
of spatial distances or locations). Whereas egocentric spatial
selectivity (however malleable) is already present before training,
rules need learned. Alternatively, the square key and little
key could be encoded holistically as a unit, with one feature
activating the entire object configuration in object memory.
For instance, in face perception, the spatial location of the
nose could be represented relative to the spatial location of
the eyes, or the face could be perceived holistically. Holistic
object recognition relies on matching entire configurations of
features to a stored template. This differs from representing
individual features’ spatial location relative to other features’
spatial location in an allocentric spatial frame, because the spatial
relationship between feature A and C should remain unchanged
if other parts of the object (features B, D, E, for example) are
removed. Logothetis (2000) has argued that not only faces, but
even arbitrary objects are processed holistically, as a unit, with
neurons responding to particular feature configurations rather
than processing individual features.
The examples in Figure 1 primarily pertain to reference
frames for spatial judgments. However, it could be argued that
the main purpose of allocentric spatial frames is navigation
and orienting in the environment. Perhaps identifying locations
as “north of” or “west of” another object would reveal true
allocentric spatial cognition. After all, north remains north
regardless of an animal’s orientation or location.
However, even seemingly external, allocentric, coordinates
such as north, south, west, and east may be re-centered on
the ego’s up, down, left and right coordinates. Figure 2 (left)
shows a right-side up map of Germany, with north pointing
up. In this orientation, it is easy to figure out, for instance, that
Moscow (Russia), located east/north-east relative to Germany, is
somewhere slightly up and to the right of the image. However,
when the map is rotated downward (Figure 2, right), it is much
harder to guess where Moscow is, despite the fact that the
cardinal directions are still indicated. Why are upside-down
maps hard to read? Subjectively, it seems that we perform better
when “north” is lined up with the egocentric “up,” and when west
and east correspond to the egocentric left and right, because we
are then able to rely on our egocentric spatial reference frame
to point relative to us. It is likely that most people mentally
rotate the map upright to match their egocentric coordinates
when making such spatial decisions, rather than relying on
an abstract, allocentric map independent of our egocentric
coordinates.
Multiple animal species may rely on magnetoreception to
orient relative to cardinal directions (Eder et al., 2012; Wu
and Dickman, 2012). Note that comparing the ego’s heading
to an external reference direction is not the same as allocentric
heading in Klatzky’s (1998) terminology, which would involve
comparing the axis of orientation of an external object and the
external reference direction (e.g., “north”). The magnetic field
axis appears to be used as an external reference direction to
which the egocentric axis is compared during navigation. In other
words, the deviation of the ego’s axis from an external axis, not the
relationship between one object’s axis and another external axis,
is signaled. Thus, the question remains: does this magnetic sense
allow animals to compute the location of one object relative to
another object (e.g., object A is “north” of object B), independent
of the animal’s orientation, or does it signal “I’m still too far
south” or “if I head this way, the destination is ahead?” The
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 December 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 648
Filimon Do Allocentric Spatial Representations Exist?
FIGURE 2 | (Left) A “right side up” map of Germany, with the four cardinal
directions (North, South, West, East) indicated. (Right) An upside-down
(rotated) map of Germany, with correspondingly rotated cardinal directions.
Pointing to Moscow (Russia) is easy with the left map, but harder with the
rotated map on the right. Despite the cardinal directions being indicated, it is
much harder to orient oneself in the map on the right. This is presumably due
to the fact that we tend to mentally line up north, south, west and east with our
egocentric coordinates: north is up, south is down, west is left, east is right. As
soon as the familiar, egocentric arrangement is disturbed, it takes us longer to
mentally rotate what is supposedly an abstract, viewer-independent, hence
allocentric map, back up to match our egocentric coordinates.
latter still entails referencing places in the environment relative
to the ego.
The process of aligning oneself with an external axis so
that, e.g., north-selective cells receive the strongest stimulation,
could be viewed as similar to a primate moving its fovea onto
an object in order to get the best (egocentric) viewpoint on
it. Aligning one’s “magnetic fovea” with the magnetic field’s
north-south (or east-west, or other) orientation could be viewed
as no more allocentric and independent of the ego than
aligning one’s retinal fovea with a source of visual stimulation
in order to get a better (fovea-centered) view of the object,
and hence the strongest stimulation. This is also separate from
the question of whether distances are represented (e.g., “50
miles north of me”), as opposed to local chemical and other
sensory cues being used to recognize landmarks upon arrival.
Navigating directly toward recognized objects or landmarks
does not constitute using an allocentric spatial map (Bennett,
1996).
The question should be not whether an external point or axis
can be represented relative to one’s own body. This would be
equivalent to assuming that “representation of any external point
must be allocentric, because that point is, after all, external to the
perceiving ego.” Any external point can be represented relative
to the ego in egocentric coordinates, thus an external object does
not by default imply allocentric processing.
Rather, the question is: are external objects represented
relative to other external object locations, independent of the
egocentric perspective (whether actual or imagined/remembered)?
Evidence for the latter would constitute a true allocentric
representation. This is precisely the role hippocampal place cells
have been proposed to play in navigation, discussed next.
NAVIGATION: DO PLACE CELLS, GRID
CELLS, AND HEAD DIRECTION CELLS
FORM AN ALLOCENTRIC MAP OF SPACE?
Upon the discovery of place cells in the rat hippocampus
(O’Keefe and Dostrovsky, 1971; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978), it was
suggested that place cells, together with head direction cells and
grid cells, form an internal ‘cognitive map’ (Tolman, 1948) of
the environment, representing allocentric space (for reviews, see
McNaughton et al., 2006; Moser et al., 2008).
Hippocampal place cells fire at a particular location in the
environment (the cell’s place field), independent of the rat’s
orientation inside that place field (Figure 3A, top). “Grid cells,”
located inmedial entorhinal cortex, display similar spatial tuning,
except that each cell has multiple firing fields, effectively forming
a periodic array or grid that tiles the environment (Figure 3B;
Moser et al., 2008). Similarly, head direction cells (Figure 3C),
present in multiple regions including the presubiculum and
thalamus, indicate the direction the animal’s head is facing,
independent of the position or orientation of the animal in
the environment (McNaughton et al., 2006). All these cells
are anchored to (visual or other sensory) environmental cues
(landmarks), and rotate or move their place fields or preferred
head direction relative to such external distal cues, if the cues
are rotated (Muller and Kubie, 1987; Moser et al., 2008). In
other words, these cells appear to signal where the animal
thinks it is located (or the direction it thinks it is facing). Place
fields, grid fields, and head direction signals also persist in the
dark, suggesting a reliance on self-motion (path integration)
information for maintaining and updating such representations
(Moser et al., 2008; e.g., by keeping track of how many steps the
animal has taken, or vestibular, head turning signals).
Due to the independence of place and grid fields of the
direction from which the animal enters a place or grid field,
and hence of the animal’s egocentric orientation, it has been
suggested that these cells contribute to an allocentric map of the
environment (Moser et al., 2008).
However, several pieces of evidence suggest alternative
interpretations to an allocentric observer-independent map of
space. Although a rat’s orientation appears to have no influence
on place cells in simple laboratory environments such as high-
walled cylinders or open circular platforms, place fields are
in fact spatially and directionally selective in environments
that require the animal to plan a route between points of
special significance, such as in radial mazes where food has
been placed (Markus et al., 1995). In such cases, place cells
respond at a particular location in the environment only if
the animal traverses that location in a particular direction, but
not in the other direction (Figure 3A). This contradicts an
abstract map-like representation of the environment, since a
place on the map should remain the same regardless of how
it is traversed. By “abstract map” I mean a “cartographer-like
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A
B
C
FIGURE 3 | (A) Place cells, (B) grid cells, and (C) head direction cells. (A) (top)
A place cell’s place field (light gray oval) rotates with the rotation of an external
cue. Note place field is independent of the rat’s orientation within it.
(A) (bottom) In T-maze environments where routes from one point to the next
can be planned, place cells exhibit directional selectivity. This place cell only
fires when the rat is moving up the maze, but not when the rat is returning.
(B) Example grid field rotating with an external cue. The rat’s orientation within
a grid spot does not matter. (C) Preferred direction of a head direction cell
rotates with an external cue.
map” independent of the animal’s orientation, goals, motivations,
memory, or other factors unrelated to the spatial relationship
between objects.
In addition, the size of a place field depends on the amount of
incoming sensory information. In big brown bats, hippocampal
place fields are small immediately after an echolocating call,
but rapidly start to diffuse as time passes and echo information
decreases (Ulanovsky and Moss, 2011). Moreover, the size of
the place field depends on the exploratory mode of the animal:
when the bat is scanning the environment from a fixed location
using echolocation (akin to a primate saccading around from
a fixed position), place fields are more diffuse, and place cells
exhibit lower firing rates, than during locomotion through
the environment (Ulanovsky and Moss, 2011). The fact that
place cells respond differently to the same locations in the
environment depending on the animal’s behavior, and amount
of sensory information received, seems to contradict an abstract
map signaling fixed, allocentric, ego-independent relationships
between places. After all, the relationship between a door and
a window should not change depending on whether the ego is
observing this relationship remotely or is passing by. Note that
this is unlikely due to a difference in recall: the animal is scanning
the landmark in question in both cases, i.e., the landmark has
been activated in memory (recalled). What appears to differ is
the egocentric relationship of the animal relative to the landmark.
Moreover, place fields are over-represented at motivationally
salient locations, such as around a hidden platform in a water
maze toward which rats are trained to swim (Hollup et al., 2001).
This suggests a dependence of the spatial representation on the
ego’s behavioral goals, rather than a cartographer-like map of the
environment.
Place cells are also re-activated during sleep, when the animal
dreams about, imagines, or remembers being in a certain place
(Pavlides andWinson, 1989). However, this is consistent with the
idea that place cells signal the animal’s current, remembered, or
imagined position in the environment relative to some landmark.
Thus, although place cells might appear to encode a cognitive,
map-like representation of an environment, place cells might not
signal abstract spatial relationships between two places or two
landmarks, independent of where the animal is located. Place
cells may instead signal place recognition, e.g., “I’m by the door,”
regardless of whether I have my back to the door or am facing the
door. If the door moves (without the animal noticing), a place
cell’s place field shifts to continue signaling “I am by the door,”
even though this is a new geocentric location. Such cells may
not indicate “The door is by the window.” In this sense, place
cells might act more like object recognition cells than cells that
represent spatial relationships between landmarks independent
of the observer.
Similarly, while grid cells may map out a regular grid across
an environment, with cells responding at fixed, regular intervals
as the animal traverses it, the rigid grid-like structure would seem
to preclude a flexible spatial representation of one object relative
to another object, since no specific object-based relationship is
signaled by such an arrangement. Both grid cells and place cells
are driven by self-motion cues as the animal keeps track of its
changing position (Moser et al., 2008).
Head direction cells signal the animal’s heading relative to
an external landmark. As described above, however, this signal
may compare an egocentric (head) orientation with an external
landmark, not the orientation of an external object to a reference
landmark.
A recently discovered type of cells, entorhinal border cells,
respond along the boundaries of an environment and may form
a reference frame for place representations (Solstad et al., 2008).
However, such cells do not fire at a distance from a wall or other
boundary, but only along the boundary. This may suggest that
rather than forming an abstract allocentric reference frame, they
signal to the animal “I am near the wall.” Thus, rather than
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signaling an abstract, allocentric environmental geometry, border
cells may similarly represent the ego relative to some landmark,
or conversely the landmark relative to the ego, not one landmark
relative to another landmark.
Further support for the idea that hippocampal place cells are
involved in place recognition in a process more akin to object
recognition than spatial cognition comes from recent evidence
that human place cells are reactivated during retrieval of objects
associated with specific episodic memories (Miller et al., 2013).
Participants navigated in a virtual environment, where they were
presented with different objects at different locations. At the end
of each trial, participants were asked to recall as many of the
items as possible, in any order. The authors found that place
cells’ firing patterns during spontaneous recall of an item were
similar to those during exploration of the environment where
they had encountered the item. This suggests that recall of objects
reactivates their spatial context, but also that place cells encode
episodic memories more generally (Miller et al., 2013). Similar
to rat place cells (Markus et al., 1995), the majority of human
place cells were direction-dependent, only exhibiting place fields
when traversed in a particular direction (Miller et al., 2013). This
is consistent with an egocentric-dependent viewpoint in scene
encoding and recognition, rather than an abstract, allocentric
map implemented by place cells.
Finally, it is unknown whether place cells, grid cells, and
other types of cells that have been studied in small-scale
laboratory environments contribute to navigation inmuch larger,
natural, environments, because it has been impossible to record
from such cells in kilometer-sized environments (Geva-Sagiv
et al., 2015). In most laboratory experiments, the entire spatial
environment can be perceived with little or no movement,
meaning that all information needed to calculate the spatial
location of different landmarks is available from the animal’s
current location (Wolbers and Wiener, 2014). This means that
in practice, the use of allocentric as opposed to egocentric
information may be poorly controlled.
While the functional interpretation of place, grid, head
direction, and boundary cells and their contribution to an
allocentric map of the environment remains unclear, behavioral
studies on animal navigation have also questioned whether
animals make use of an allocentric, cognitive map during
navigation.
Bennett (1996) has argued that a critical test of a “cognitive
map” of space is the ability to take novel shortcuts, instead of
following previously experienced routes. According to Bennett,
previous evidence for shortcut-taking and putative cognitive
maps in insects, birds, rodents, as well as human and non-
human primates can be explained more simply either as path
integration or recognition of familiar landmarks from a different
angle, followed by movement toward them. The animal would
thus only need to memorize routes and recognize landmarks
to navigate toward them, rather than store a detailed cognitive
map of spatial relationships between landmarks. The lack of
shortcut-taking ability and hence absence of evidence for a
cognitive map is supported by more recent research in a variety
of species (Wehner et al., 2006; Grieves and Dudchenko, 2013).
Instead, many species appear to rely on view-dependent place
recognition, and to match learned viewpoints when approaching
landmarks (Wang and Spelke, 2002).
However, when path integration and view-dependent place
recognition fail, subjects do appear to be reorienting based on
the geometry of a room or based on the “shape of the surface
layout” (Wang and Spelke, 2002). Disoriented subjects search
for target objects both at the correct corner and geometrically
opposite corner of a room—but do not appear to be relying on the
spatial configuration between objects (Wang and Spelke, 2002).
In other words, not all allocentric information is represented;
instead, simpler, geometric layout information is used, which
perhaps functions more like object recognition.
In summary, it is unclear if place cells, grid cells, border cells,
and head direction cells form the building blocks of an abstract,
allocentric map of the environment for navigation, and to what
extent these cells are involved in representing the spatial location
of an external object relative to another object. Behavioral studies
have questioned whether animals actually use an allocentric map
for navigation, and whether whichever internal representation is
used has the same characteristics as an abstract, cartographic map
of the environment (Ekstrom et al., 2014).
BEHAVIORAL STUDIES: SPATIAL
REFERENCE FRAMES FOR
GOAL-DIRECTED MOVEMENT
Several behavioral studies have investigated which spatial
reference frames are used in goal-directed actions, such as
(delayed or immediate) pointing, reaching, grasping, or saccades
to (visual or remembered) targets (for reviews, see Battaglia-
Mayer et al., 2003; Crawford et al., 2011). Many such studies
have investigated spatial reference frames in the context of spatial
updating (Colby, 1998; Crawford et al., 2011), where a spatial
target is briefly presented, followed by a change in gaze direction
before the reach (or saccade) to the remembered location of the
target. Saccade or reach endpoint errors and other metrics can
then be investigated in the context of landmarks being present vs.
absent at the moment of target presentation (Figure 4).
Substantial evidence exists for gaze-centered (egocentric)
updating of reach targets following an intervening saccade, for
both immediate and delayed movements (Henriques et al., 1998;
Medendorp and Crawford, 2002; Thompson and Henriques,
2008; Rogers et al., 2009; Selen and Medendorp, 2011). These
studies suggest that the spatial location of a visual target is
maintained in an eye-centered reference frame (i.e., as the retinal
distance between the current gaze direction or fixation point,
and the remembered target location), and is updated across eye
movements. While some evidence suggests that gaze-centered
updating persists even after long delays (Fiehler et al., 2011),
others have suggested that allocentric spatial representations are
used when movements are delayed (Westwood and Goodale,
2003).
Several studies have demonstrated more accurate reaching
in the presence of landmarks following gaze shifts (e.g., Byrne
et al., 2010), and that integration of egocentric and allocentric
or landmark information may depend on the stability of
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FIGURE 4 | Example stimuli used to probe allocentric spatial reference
frames (see text). (A) Four landmarks surround an initially displayed reach
target. Following a gaze shift (fixation cross moves), the landmarks reappear at a
novel location, prompting the subject to point to the remembered target relative
to the landmarks. Example based on Chen et al. (2011). (B) A target is displayed
relative to a horizontal bar. After a delay, the bar reappears without the target.
The monkey saccades to the bar-relative location of the target. Inspired by
Olson (2003). (C) Example maze stimuli to test for maze solving. Adapted from
Crowe et al. (2004), with permission. (D, E) Example object construction tasks.
Panel (D) shows a model, followed by the removal of a critical element defined in
relation to the model object. Following a delay, the monkey selects the missing
piece to complete the object. (E) Ambiguous model object: the monkey does
not know which of the two knobs (left and right squares) will be removed.
Adapted from Chafee et al. (2005) (see text), with permission.
visual cues; i.e., the weight assigned to landmarks depends on
whether the landmark is moving around (Byrne and Crawford,
2010). Note that the presence of a landmark should not
automatically be assumed to involve allocentric (object-centered)
reference frames. Both the landmark and the target could
be represented relative to the ego. However, can behavioral
differences between memory-guided reaches with and without
landmarks be explained without relying on the assumption that
an allocentric spatial reference frame is used? What accounts for
the observed behavioral effects? I will describe two representative
experiments in detail to illustrate how egocentrically-encoded
landmarks could contribute to such differences.
In a study by Schütz et al. (2013), subjects reached to
remembered target locations after intervening saccades, either in
the presence or absence of visual landmarks. Subjects foveated
a briefly displayed target, and continued fixating its location
after its disappearance. After a delay of 0, 8, or 12 s subjects
then saccaded to a new fixation cross which appeared at various
visual eccentricities. Following the gaze shift, the fixation cross
also disappeared and subjects reached to the remembered target
location in complete darkness. In the allocentric condition, two
light tubes were present left and right of the screen, respectively.
Pointing errors varied systematically with gaze shift, e.g., when
fixating to the left, subjects overshot the remembered target
location in the opposite direction, in both the visual landmark
and the no-landmark condition. This is consistent with previous
evidence that reaching is carried out in eye-centered (hence,
egocentric) coordinates (Henriques et al., 1998). Moreover, the
different delays led to similar reach endpoint errors, i.e., the
effect of the (egocentric) gaze shift remained the same regardless
of a delay or not. This suggests that both immediate and
delayed reaches rely on gaze-dependent (egocentric) spatial
representations.
In addition to varying with gaze shift (an egocentric
influence), however, endpoint errors were reduced in the
landmark condition. One possible interpretation of this
landmark influence is that egocentric and allocentric spatial
representations are combined (Schütz et al., 2013). While it
is possible that reach targets are represented relative to both
landmarks and gaze position, an entirely egocentric explanation
cannot be ruled out. For instance, both the initial target and the
landmarks could be represented in gaze-centered coordinates.
In the no-landmark condition, the target disappears before the
fixation cross reappears at a novel location, with the subject
sitting in complete darkness during the variable delay. When
the novel fixation cross appears, the egocentric estimate of
how far the eyes have moved relative to the remembered
target (the retinal distance) is less precise. Even in the 0 s delay
condition, the target still disappears before the new fixation
cross appears, i.e., the new fixation location and the target are
never simultaneously displayed, which may lead to a less precise
calculation of the saccade vector from (former) target location
to (novel) fixation cross location. Previous research (Chen et al.,
2011) has shown egocentric information decays gradually, with
decay commencing as soon as the target disappears (Westwood
and Goodale, 2003). In the absence of external visual landmarks,
these factors could thus contribute to a less accurate estimation
of how far the eyes have moved away from the initial target
location, or greater uncertainty regarding gaze position relative
to the former target location (in retinal coordinates), when
the reach is initiated. In contrast, in the allocentric landmark
condition the landmarks are present throughout the trial, which
can lead to a more accurate retinal (egocentric) estimate of how
far the eyes have moved. Subjects can represent both the target
and the landmarks relative to their gaze when initially viewing
the target, and update this eye-centered representation after the
saccade. For instance, the left landmark may be at−10◦ of visual
angle relative to the target in the beginning, and at −5◦ after
the saccade to the new fixation cross, when the reach target has
disappeared. The gaze shift vector (in eye-centered coordinates)
will thus be estimated more accurately, and can be subtracted
from the previous eye-centered position of the hand, to more
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accurately lead the hand to the remembered target position (in
eye-centered coordinates, e.g., Medendorp and Crawford, 2002).
Thus, although the combination of allocentric and egocentric
cues remains a possibility, the reduced endpoint reach error
in the landmark condition could be explained in terms of
less accurate egocentric updating. This explanation is more
parsimonious, as it involves a single (egocentric) spatial reference
frame. To tease apart these competing accounts, the egocentric
account makes a testable prediction: if the new fixation cross
were to appear before the target is extinguished, there should
be reduced uncertainty regarding how far the eyes have moved,
even in the absence of landmarks, and hence reduced endpoint
errors, similar to the landmark condition. Future experiments
could address this prediction. A second prediction could be tested
to tease apart allocentric vs. egocentric influences: the two light
tubes (landmarks) could be briefly turned off at the same time
as the target, during the saccade to a new fixation cross. The
landmarks could reappear just before or at the time of the reach.
The prediction is that a disruption in egocentric updating of how
far the eyes havemovedwill lead to greater reach error, evenwhen
the landmarks reappear later. This would support an egocentric
explanation of the landmark effect.
In another study, Chen et al. (2011) compared the rate
of memory decay for egocentric and allocentric reach targets,
using delayed reaching to remembered target locations following
intervening saccades.
In the egocentric condition, a target appeared in the periphery
relative to the fixation cross. After the target disappeared, subjects
shifted their gaze to a new fixation location. Following a variable
(short, medium, or long) delay, the fixation cross disappeared,
and subjects reached to the remembered (and egocentrically
remapped) location of the reach target.
In the allocentric condition (Figure 4A), the target was
surrounded by four landmarks. These landmarks reappeared at
a different location following the short, medium or long delay
after the gaze shift, and subjects reached to the remembered (and
remapped) target location, relative to the landmarks.
In a similar third condition, the allo-to-ego conversion
condition, the four landmarks reappeared at the new location
both before and after the variable delay.
The authors found that in the egocentric and allo-to-
ego conversion condition, reaching variance (endpoint error,
reduced precision) increased from short to medium delays,
whereas reaching variance remained constant across delays in the
allocentric condition. Similarly, reaction times in the egocentric
and allo-to-ego conditions were longer at short delays compared
to longer delays, whereas reaction times did not vary according
to delay in the allocentric condition. The authors concluded that
egocentric representations of target locations decay faster than
allocentric representations. It was also suggested that allocentric
information is converted to an egocentric representation at the
first possible opportunity (Chen et al., 2011). Thus, the allocentric
landmarks appearing both before and after the delay in the
allo-to-ego condition could be used to infer the location of
the target in egocentric coordinates before the delay (an allo-
to-ego conversion at the first opportunity), and this egocentric
information decays with increasing delays. This interpretation
could explain the increase in endpoint errors across delays in
the egocentric and the allo-to-ego conditions, and the absence
of a modulation by delay in the allocentric condition (when
landmarks only appear after delays).
Can these behavioral differences between egocentric and
allocentric conditions be explained using a purely egocentric
reference frame? It is possible that both the target and
the surrounding landmarks were represented in egocentric
coordinates, and were mentally shifted to center on the fovea
(i.e., the center of mass of the square in Figure 4A would line
up with the fixation point). As such, a target closer to e.g., the
bottom left landmark would also be in the egocentric lower left
relative to the fovea. When the landmarks reappeared at a new
egocentric location, the new target location could be remapped
in egocentric coordinates based on shifting the entire structure
(landmarks plus retinocentrically remapped/remembered target)
to the new retinal location. Alternatively, even without mentally
shifting the landmarks to imagine them around the fixation point,
retinal distance vectors can be computed from the fixation point
to both the landmark nearest the target (“vector x”) and to the
target (“vector y”). The difference between vectors x and y can
be stored as a retinal vector (“z”). When the landmark reappears
at a different location in the visual field, the retinal vector to its
(egocentric) coordinates is calculated, and the difference vector z
can be added to infer the new target location in egocentric, rather
than allocentric, coordinates. Egocentric remapping of targets has
been demonstrated in multiple brain regions (Colby, 1998).
Why then were there differences between egocentric and
allocentric reach accuracies and reaction times? Unlike in the
egocentric condition, the allocentric landmarks reappear after
the delay, just before movement onset, thereby facilitating
remapping of the remembered target in egocentric coordinates
just before movement onset. Since the landmarks are displayed
just before movement onset in each of the three delay conditions,
with the delays preceding, not following, the reappearance of the
landmarks at the new location, the (egocentrically) remapped
location does not get a chance to decay before movement onset.
This could explain the shorter and constant reaction times in the
landmark condition compared to the egocentric condition. In
contrast, in the egocentric condition no new cues are presented
after the intervening saccade and variable delay. The longer the
delay, the greater the egocentric information decay, consistent
with the authors’ interpretation (Chen et al., 2011).
What about the allo-to-ego condition, which resembled the
egocentric condition in terms of an increase in reach errors
across delays? In the allo-to-ego condition, the amount of time
the landmarks are displayed at the new location is halved:
instead of reappearing for 1.5 s after the delay, they appear
for only 0.75 s before and 0.75 s after the variable delay. This
shorter presentation time may have led subjects to rely on the
first reappearance of the landmarks to update both landmarks
and the target in egocentric coordinates, as suggested by the
authors. Since the variable delay follows the first reappearance
of landmarks, egocentric information decays just like in the
no-landmark, egocentric, condition.
In summary, although it is possible that a fundamental
difference exists between egocentric spatial representations,
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thought to decay rapidly across delays, and allocentric spatial
representations, which are thought to be more stable and
decay less rapidly, these results are equally compatible with
an egocentric remapping of all targets, whether surrounded by
landmarks or not, accompanied by an egocentric decay in all
cases where the remapped information precedes a variable delay.
This and similar studies therefore do not necessarily demonstrate
the existence of allocentric spatial representations.
Behavioral studies have also investigated visual illusions such
as the Müller–Lyer illusion, in which a line segment is flanked
by either pointed arrow heads or arrow tails. Subjects perceive
identical-length segments with arrow tails as longer than those
with arrow heads, which could be interpreted as evidence of
allocentric encoding of object features relative to each other.
However, Howe and Purves (2005) have shown that this illusion
can be explained by natural image statistics where the physical
sources giving rise to a 2D retinal image of a line segment with
arrow heads tend to belong to the same plane (object, or surface
area), whereas physical sources for arrow tails are less likely to
come from the same plane. The illusion could thus arise from a
probabilistic interpretation of 2D retinal projections of the real
world—and would not require allocentric spatial encoding of
individual features. A review of 33 studies of pointing to Müller–
Lyer stimuli showed that visually-guided pointing (rather than
frommemory) is typically not subject to theMüller–Lyer illusion,
suggesting that this illusion is mediated by the ventral rather than
dorsal visual stream (Bruno et al., 2008).
Other studies have investigated pointing accuracy to
surrounding objects after subjects were disoriented through
self-rotation, with objects hidden from view (Wang and Spelke,
2000, 2002). In such experiments subjects show increased
configuration pointing errors, i.e., a deterioration in the internal
representation of the angular relationship between targets (e.g.,
where the TV is relative to the table). This has been interpreted as
a disruption to dynamic egocentric updating of target locations
(relative to the current ego location), even after controlling
for vestibular stimulation, re-orientation via an external light,
and other factors, contradicting an enduring cognitive map of
allocentric spatial relations between objects independent of the
observer (Wang and Spelke, 2000).
Conversely, other studies have shown that disorientation leads
to much lower error in “judgments of relative direction” (JRD
tasks), where, rather than pointing from the current ego location
to objects’ locations, subjects imagine themselves by an object
and point to another object from that imagined location (e.g.,
imagining the ego by the door and pointing toward the TV from
that location; Burgess, 2006; Waller and Hodgson, 2006; Ekstrom
et al., 2014).
However, it is unclear whether higher performance in the
JRD task necessarily means subjects rely on stored allocentric
representations of object locations relative to each other. The JRD
task may simply involve accessing stored egocentric viewpoints,
mentally rotating (shifting) the ego to one of the objects, and
making an egocentric decision as to where objects are—relative
to the ego. In Waller and Hodgson’s study (Waller and Hodgson,
2006), for example, participants walked past each of the objects
to be encoded, thereby presumably obtaining multiple egocentric
viewpoints on the scene layout. Disorientation does not affect
JRDs compared to pointing from the current ego orientation,
because JRDs rely on stored egocentric viewpoints, whereas
orientation-dependent pointing requires re-establishing ego-
relative object locations anew. Behavioral differences or effects
between two experimental conditions thus do not necessarily
demonstrate that allocentric vs. egocentric spatial reference
frames are used. The two tasks can be viewed as different
egocentric tasks, with differences due different egocentric
mechanisms being activated (mental rotation of the ego and
recall of egocentric viewpoints vs. remapping current target
locations relative to the ego following disorientation). Such
mental rotations are supported by evidence that recognition
times of arrays of objects displayed on a circular table, when
rotated to various degrees, increase linearly with the angle of
rotation away from the original display (Wang and Spelke, 2002).
If allocentric tasks can be solved by mentally rotating or
shifting either the ego or a display of landmarks back to an
egocentric (perhaps retinal) center, what if only subsets of objects
are shifted in a scene—could reach errors reveal whether subjects
encode targets relative to objects rather than the ego? Fiehler et al.
(2014) found that the greater the number of objects shifted, the
greater the deviation of reach endpoints in the direction of object
shifts. While this suggests a plausible allocentric mechanism
whereby target locations are encoded relative to other objects,
rather than relative to the ego, this could depend on whether
an egocentric reference point is provided during encoding of
object (target) locations. If a retinal reference point is missing
(no fixation cross provided during encoding), subjects may not
notice shifts in clusters of objects and still rely on view-dependent
(partial) scene recognition, with reaching performed relative
to a presumed egocentric reference point that could not be
accurately established during encoding. Shifting single large or
single smaller local objects had no effect on reach endpoint
errors (Fiehler et al., 2014). Similar view-dependent local scene
encoding or retinal visual distance calculations can account
for other studies in which combined egocentric and allocentric
influences were examined (Byrne and Henriques, 2012; Camors
et al., 2015).
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY:
OBJECT-CENTERED SPATIAL NEGLECT?
A number of neuropsychological studies of hemineglect patients
have identified seemingly dissociable egocentric vs. object-
centered (or allocentric) neglect symptoms, as well as dissociable
brain damage sites (for reviews and critiques, see Olson, 2003;
Rorden et al., 2012; Yue et al., 2012; Humphreys et al., 2013; Li
et al., 2014).
Following damage to (predominantly) the right hemisphere,
patients exhibit unawareness of the contralateral (egocentric
left) side of space (Humphreys et al., 2013). In addition to
egocentrically-defined hemineglect, some patients ignore the left
half of an object or of objects, even if presented in their intact
(egocentrically right) hemifield, or even if rotated such that
the left half of the object falls on the (intact) right visual field
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 December 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 648
Filimon Do Allocentric Spatial Representations Exist?
(e.g., Caramazza and Hillis, 1990; Driver and Halligan, 1991;
Behrmann and Moscovitch, 1994; Behrmann and Tipper, 1994;
for review, see Humphreys et al., 2013). The fact that the left half
of an object is neglected even when rotated and presented in the
egocentric right half of space has been interpreted as evidence for
object-centered spatial representations.
However, alternative explanations have been proposed for
this pattern of object-based hemineglect. For instance, rotated
objects presented in non-canonical orientations may be mentally
rotated back upright to match an egocentric, canonical (mental)
representation of the object, the left half of which is then ignored
(Buxbaum et al., 1996; Humphreys et al., 2013).
Similarly, computational models suggest that a decreasing
attentional gradient from (the egocentric) right to left could
lead to the left half of any item anywhere in the visual field
being less salient and therefore more likely to be ignored (Driver
and Pouget, 2000; Pouget and Sejnowski, 2001). Models relying
on such “relative egocentric neglect” (Driver and Pouget, 2000;
Pouget and Sejnowski, 2001) have successfully modeled what
appears to be object-centered neglect (Pouget and Sejnowski,
1997, 2001; Mozer, 1999, 2002).
Such a lesion-induced (egocentric) gradient of salience, which
could affect either the stored representation of an object or the
allocation of attention to this representation, is supported by
evidence that the severity of allocentric neglect is modulated
by egocentric position, with milder allocentric deficits at more
ipsilesional egocentric positions (Niemeier and Karnath, 2002;
Karnath et al., 2011). The field of view across which such a
gradient in salience is exhibited may be flexibly adjusted (similar
to a zoom lens; Niemeier and Karnath, 2002; Karnath et al., 2011;
Rorden et al., 2012). For instance, exploratory eye movement
patterns in neglect patients did not differ between egocentric and
allocentric neglect, but rather differed according to the task goal
and strategies, with the same item either detected or neglected
depending on the task (Karnath and Niemeier, 2002).
However, double dissociations between egocentric and
allocentric neglect have been reported, together with apparent
double-dissociations in lesion sites (Humphreys and Heinke,
1998; Humphreys et al., 2013). Egocentric neglect tends to be
associated with more anterior sites in supramarginal gyrus and
superior temporal cortex, whereas allocentric neglect tends to
correlate withmore posterior injuries such as to the angular gyrus
(Medina et al., 2009; Chechlacz et al., 2010; Verdon et al., 2010).
In contrast, several recent studies have reported that
allocentric neglect co-occurs with egocentric neglect, and that the
lesion sites overlap (Rorden et al., 2012; Yue et al., 2012; Li et al.,
2014). Rorden et al. argue that previous studies have used vague
or categorical criteria in classifying patients with allocentric vs.
egocentric neglect, leading to an apparent double dissociation
between deficits. (For instance, a patient with both egocentric
and allocentric deficits would be categorized as allocentric-only,
leading to an apparent double-dissociation). To identify whether
egocentric and object-centered neglect are dissociable, Rorden
et al. used a “defect detection” task in which right-hemisphere
stroke patients had to separately circle intact circles and triangles
as well as circles and triangles with a “defect” (e.g., a gap in the
left half of a circle). Unlike previous studies, which had coded
allocentric and egocentric neglect in a categorical, dichotomous
manner, thereby ignoring the varying severity of deficits, Rorden
et al. used a continuous measure. Allocentric neglect scores were
calculated based on the number of correctly detected items with
defects as well as intact items correctly marked, on both the
contralesional and ipsilesional side. In addition, they also used
a center of cancelation task to calculate egocentric neglect scores
based on how many targets (e.g., the letter A) were identified in
a cluttered field of letters, weighted according to their position
from left to right.
Confirming previous findings by Yue et al. (2012), Rorden
et al. (2012) found that allocentric deficits were always observed
in conjunction with egocentric deficits, with no pure cases of
allocentric neglect. In contrast, egocentric neglect did occur on
its own. The allocentric neglect score was strongly correlated
with patients’ egocentric neglect score, and substantial allocentric
neglect was only present with substantial egocentric neglect,
suggesting that allocentric neglect is a function of severe
egocentric neglect.
Moreover, the regions of brain damage associated with
egocentric and allocentric neglect strongly overlapped. Rorden
et al. (2012) suggest that previous findings of an association
between posterior temporo-parietal lesions with allocentric
neglect, and superior and middle temporal lesions with
egocentric neglect, may in fact result from the same mechanism,
namely the extent to which the middle cerebral artery territory
is affected by stroke. According to this account, allocentric
deficits may be subclinical in milder forms of neglect, which are
associated with damage restricted to the central aspect of the
middle cerebral artery territory, thus producing what appears
to be purely egocentric neglect. In contrast, more severe forms
of neglect, comprising both egocentric and allocentric deficits,
are due to damage to a larger extent of middle cerebral artery
territory, including more posterior regions typically associated
with allocentric neglect.
The fact that patterns of object-centered neglect can be
explained in terms of an egocentric gradient in salience, as
well as recent evidence of a lack of double-dissociation between
egocentric and allocentric neglect symptoms and lesion sites,
argue against independent egocentric and allocentric spatial
representations, and support a single (egocentric) mechanism.
Other neuropsychological investigations have focused on
lesions to the ventral visual stream. For instance, patient
D.F. shows impairment in (conscious) visual shape perception,
but accurate visuomotor performance (such as correct grip
aperture) in actions directed to different object shapes (Goodale
and Milner, 1992; Goodale and Humphrey, 1998). This has
been interpreted as evidence for separate vision for perception
(ventral) and vision for action (dorsal) streams (Goodale and
Milner, 1992). Schenk (2006) has questioned whether D.F.’s
impairment is perceptual, rather than allocentric. In Schenk
(2006), D.F. was impaired on a visuomotor task that involved
proprioceptively-guided pointing to the right or left of the
current hand position by a similar amount as displayed visually
between a visual cross and visual target. As suggested by Milner
and Goodale (2008), however, the impairment could have been
due to the task requiring D.F. to make a perceptual judgment
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(visual estimate) of the distance between the visual stimuli, before
being able to translate that visual distance into a visuomotor plan
to a different location. Moreover, this estimate could happen via
a “perspectival” (egocentric viewpoint-dependent) mechanism
(Foley et al., 2015), rather than an allocentric mechanism.
The latter interpretation would thus suggest the ventral visual
stream is involved in perceptual (e.g., visual size) estimates
underlying shape perception, not necessarily allocentric spatial
cognition.
Foley et al. (2015) have argued that whereas the dorsal visual
stream uses effector-based egocentric spatial representations,
the ventral visual stream may use a perspectival egocentric
representation of scenes or objects. Note that this perspectival
account is compatible with holistic configural scene or object
processing (Logothetis, 2000). Moreover, according to Foley
et al., the purpose of ventral visual stream computations is
object recognition, attaching emotional or reward value to such a
representation, or habitual learning (i.e., what to do with such an
object, regardless of the current egocentric perspective on it).
These proposed processes are consistent with the findings
presented in the present review, and are compatible with an
egocentric account of spatial processing.
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY: EVIDENCE FOR
OBJECT-BASED SPATIAL
REPRESENTATIONS, OR RULE-BASED
DECISIONS?
Neurophysiological studies have shown that multiple egocentric
(e.g., hand-centered and eye-centered) representations of the
same target can co-exist in parallel or change fluidly during
sensorimotor transformations (Battaglia-Mayer et al., 2003). In
fact, many neurons exhibit hybrid (e.g., both eye and hand-
centered) reference frames (Avillac et al., 2005; Mullette-Gillman
et al., 2009). Here I examine whether single-unit neurophysiology
evidence supports the representation of an allocentric reference
frame at the neuronal level at any point in the sensorimotor
transformation. A number of single-unit recording studies
have reported object-centered spatial representations in both
prefrontal and posterior parietal cortex. In a series of studies,
Olson and colleagues (Olson and Gettner, 1995, 1999; Olson and
Tremblay, 2000; Tremblay et al., 2002; for review, see Olson,
2003) reported object-centered spatial selectivity in macaque
supplementary eye field (SEF) neurons during saccade planning.
A typical task (Figure 4B) involves first presenting a horizontal
bar with a cue left or right on the bar, at various retinal locations,
while the monkey is fixating centrally. Following a variable-
duration delay, the horizontal bar is presented at another location
in the visual field. After a second variable-length delay, the
fixation point disappears and the monkey executes a saccade to
the remembered target location relative to the object, i.e., left
or right on the bar, regardless of whether the bar is now in
the left or right visual field. Interestingly, many SEF neurons
show differential activity during the post-cue delay prior to
object-left vs. object-right saccades, even though the monkey
does not yet know the direction of the physical saccade. In
other words, while the monkey is holding the object-centered
location in working memory, after the bar and cue disappear, but
before the new horizontal bar appears, SEF cells selectively signal
object-right vs. object-left locations, suggesting object-centered
spatial selectivity. This effect is also obtained if color cues or
discontinuous objects/cues (e.g., left vs. right of two dots) are
used to instruct left vs. right saccades relative to the object (Olson,
2003).
While these results are consistent with object-centered
spatial representations in SEF, several additional findings allow
for an alternative interpretation. For instance, the neurons
that prefer the bar-right condition are predominantly in the
left hemisphere, while bar-left neurons predominate in the
right hemisphere (Olson, 2003), consistent with an egocentric
contralateral representation of each half of space. The fact that
neurons selective for object coordinates are arranged according
to egocentric space in the brain could suggest a recentering of the
mental representation of the object during the delay, such that the
left half of the object falls in the (egocentrically) left visual field
and the right half of the object in the (egocentrically) right visual
field.
The idea that a (re-)centered mental representation is driving
these responses is also supported by other characteristics of
SEF neurons’ responses: the object-centered spatial selectivity
emerges during the post-cue delay, even when the new target bar
isn’t visible yet, i.e., before a new object-relative target position
can be calculated (e.g., Figures 1, 4, in Olson, 2003).
Interestingly, color cues take longer (200ms) than spatial
configuration cues to evoke object-centered activity, suggesting
a top-down, rule-based decision process, perhaps coming from
other prefrontal regions such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC). SEF neurons can also learn to respond to color
instructions even if the color cue that signals an object-left rule
appears at the right of the object (dot array; Olson, 2003). In
such cases, the neuron indicates both the object-relative location
of the cue (i.e., if the neuron prefers left on the object, yet
the cue signaling a future left-object saccade appears on the
right, the neuron responds weakly to the cue) and the object-
relative location of the target (i.e., if the target then appears
on the left in a left-object preferring neuron, a strong response
is obtained; Olson, 2003). This pattern has been interpreted as
object-centered spatial selectivity, and that the target could not
be selected by an object-centered rule (since the cue appeared on
the right of the object, and yet instructed a left response; Olson,
2003). However, this response pattern occurred in SEF neurons
previously trained to select targets using precisely an object-
centered rule. Importantly, as discussed by Olson (2003), SEF
neurons only show weak object-centered signals before training.
This training-dependence suggests that rather than
responding to object-based spatial locations in a bottom-up
manner (via object-centered spatial selectivity), such putatively
object-centered neurons require extensive training, i.e., respond
most likely to top-down signals. This could suggest rule-based
decision making signals from other (perhaps dorsolateral
prefrontal) regions, rather than spatial perception in an object-
centered spatial reference frame. A testable prediction is that
DLPFC activity should precede SEF activity on such tasks. In
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humans, a testable fMRI prediction would be that the effective
connectivity between e.g., DLPFC and SEF should increase when
the rule needs applied.
This interpretation of a superimposition of a rule onto SEF
neuronal activity is also consistent with the fact that SEF neurons
showed a modulation by egocentric saccade directions, i.e., a
right-object selective SEF neuron still showed some preference
for physically (egocentric) rightward saccades even if they fell on
the (non-preferred) left end of the object (Olson, 2003).
Other studies have investigated object-centered
representations in posterior parietal areas (for review, see
Chafee and Crowe, 2012). Crowe et al. (2004) recorded from
inferior parietal area 7a while monkeys were shown visual stimuli
depicting octogonal mazes (viewed from the top), with a straight
main path extending from the center box out (Figure 4C). In exit
mazes, the main path exited to the perimeter, whereas in no-exit
mazes, the main path ended in a dead end inside the maze.
Monkeys mentally solved mazes to determine whether each
maze had an exit path or not, without moving their eyes from the
fixation point located at the center of each maze. While mentally
solving the maze task, one quarter of neurons in parietal area 7a
exhibited spatial tuning for maze path directions.
Interestingly, and consistent with the top-down hypothesis
of object-centered processing, neuronal tuning for maze path
direction only emerged after training (Crowe et al., 2004). In
other words, naive animals that viewed the same maze stimuli
without solving them did not show tuning to path direction. This
argues against an existing, object-centered spatial representation,
i.e., an “allocentric lens” through which spatial relationships
in the world are viewed. If object-based spatial relationships
did exist, these neurons should have represented them in a
“bottom-up” manner just like retinocentric or egocentric spatial
relationships are represented, which do not require task training.
A neuron that has a preference for a certain object-centered
spatial relationship (e.g., maze path exiting to the right of
the maze) should exhibit such an object-centered preference
whenever the monkey is looking at such a stimulus. It is possible
that allocentric spatial tuning takes longer to develop with more
complex visual stimuli, where multiple object-centered spatial
relationships could be represented. Such training dependence,
however, is also observed for simple bar stimuli, as reported by
Olson (2003).
As in SEF, object-centered parietal area 7a neurons had a
preference for contralateral path directions. In other words,
neurons located in the left hemisphere preferred maze exits to
the egocentric right. However, preferred maze path directions
(e.g., up and to the right) were largely independent of receptive
field (RF) locations as mapped with spot stimuli (Crowe et al.,
2004). Spatial tuning for path direction in the maze task was also
not systematically related to saccade direction tuning as mapped
in an oculomotor control task. While this dissociation between
the RFs mapped using control tasks and maze path direction
would seem to suggest an independence of egocentric variables,
it is also possible that individual neurons’ RFs obtained with the
visually more complex maze object shift dynamically with more
complex tasks. The fact that the maze task needs solved mentally
(without moving the eyes) would suggest that some mental
remapping of information across receptive fields is necessary.
I.e., neurons might dynamically and predictively represent the
information expected to fall in their RFs if the eyes were moved.
Thus, the classically defined RF location as mapped by spot light
stimuli would seem less relevant than finding out what kind of
remapping might be happening during mental solving of the
maze task. Remapping of information even prior to saccades has
been demonstrated in neighboring area LIP (Colby, 1998).
In fact, a subsequent study of the maze task (Crowe
et al., 2005) studied the neuronal population dynamics during
maze task solving. Crowe et al. (2005) found that following
presentation of the maze, the population vector (the direction
signaled by the majority of cells) in parietal area 7a began to grow
in the direction of the exit path. In trials in which maze paths had
a right-angle turn, the population vector rotated in the direction
of the turn, however, not 90◦, but 45◦.
In other words, imagine a triangle corner centered at the
fovea, with one triangle side extending vertically up from the
fixation point; from the top of the vertical side, another side
extends to the right, forming a right angle with the vertical line.
If you were to move your eyes up one side of the triangle and
then turn 90◦ right, the hypotenuse is 45◦ relative to the vertical
meridian from your initial fixation point. In object coordinates,
the configuration of the path toward the exit is first up, then 90◦
to the right. However, the populations of cells that became active
were first cells preferring up, then cells preferring 45◦ to the right.
This is the vector angle one would expect if the vector origin
were anchored to the fovea (initial fixation point), with the tip of
the vector signaling the maze exit from the foveal origin to 45◦ up
and to the right, as suggested by the authors (Crowe et al., 2005;
Chafee and Crowe, 2012). This suggests the maze problem was
solved from an egocentric, specifically retinocentric, perspective,
and is less consistent with an object-centered representation, at
least at the population level.
Another approach to studying object-centered spatial
representations is to use a visual “object construction task”
(Figures 4D,E), in which presentation of a model object
consisting of a configuration of elements is followed by a test
object in which one element is missing (Chafee et al., 2005, 2007).
For instance, an inverted T-like structure consisting of Tetris-like
blocks arranged vertically and horizontally was followed by a
test structure where one block was missing left or right of the
vertical object axis. Monkeys were trained to then “complete”
the test object by choosing between two elements, one of which
was on the correct side of the missing element location. Once
the element was chosen, it was attached to the test object at the
appropriate location.
By presenting either the test object or the model object
at different retinal locations, Chafee et al. (2005, 2007) could
investigate whether neurons in area 7a are sensitive to the
object-referenced location of the missing element (e.g., top right
of the object) regardless of the egocentric (retinal) location
of the element. Chafee and colleagues found two populations
of neurons in area 7a. One population coded the missing
element in viewer-referenced (egocentric) coordinates, whereas
a partially overlapping population encoded the missing element
in object-referenced coordinates, signaling themissing piece both
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when the test object appeared left and right of the fixation cross.
Object-centered neurons showed object-centered responses both
when the whole shape (model) was presented, and when the test
object (with a missing piece) was shown.
Several neurons indicated a joint viewer- and object-
referenced influence, responding more strongly when both the
element and the object were on the preferred side (for instance,
both on the egocentric left and object-referenced left).
As in Olson (2003), this task (Chafee et al., 2005, 2007) allows
either the model or the test object to be mentally translated to the
ego-center (the fovea), where left or right on the object becomes
a simple egocentric decision. The putative object-referenced
population could thus be remapping locations in an ego-relative
way. Consistent with the ego-relative interpretation, and similar
to Olson (2003) and Crowe et al. (2004, 2005), object-referenced
neurons preferred contralateral “missing elements” (relative to
the object).
Moreover, the data suggest that this process is rule-dependent.
In some trials, model objects contained two elements, one left
and one right on the object, either of which could be removed in
the test stage (Figure 4E). During the delay between model and
test object presentation, the monkey could thus not know which
of the elements would be removed for such ambiguous model
objects. Interestingly, in contrast to trials where the element
that would be removed was obvious during the model stage,
there were no object-centered responses during presentation of
the indeterminate model object, with object-centered responses
only emerging after the test object revealed which element was
missing.
Why would an object-centered neuron not signal “left on the
object” regardless of which element (left or right) would end
up being removed? It could be argued that if these neurons
were encoding spatial locations relative to objects, then neurons
selective for “left of the object” should have signaled the object-
relative location of the element during the indeterminate model
presentation as well as during test object (missing-piece-object)
presentation. The fact that neurons “waited” until the missing
element was revealed during the test object phase suggests that
such neurons might encode rules, not spatial relations: at the
moment of the ambiguous model, neurons could not yet apply
any rule, since either of the two elements could be removed; the
rule to be applied only emerged in the test stage. This suggests
that these neurons do not have a true object-centered spatial
preference such as “left on the object.” Rather, they encode the
rule “detect if a certain ego-relative element is missing.” Thus,
a coding of relative retinocentric position, rather than object-
centered spatial reference frames, cannot be ruled out.
If neurons in inferior parietal area 7a are involved in mentally
re-centering a peripherally-displayed visual stimulus such that it
lines up with the fovea or ego center, one would expect object-
centered responses that signal “object left” or “object right”
regardless of retinal position to be somewhat delayed compared
to simple egocentric responses. In fact, this is exactly what was
found by Crowe et al. (2008). Information in retina-centered
coordinates emerged first, and was followed by neural signals
coding object-relative positions. The strength of egocentric
and object-centered signals was correlated, and object-centered
responses could be predicted from retina-centered responses,
but not vice versa (Crowe et al., 2008). Thus, each location
on an object is presumably first represented retinocentrically,
e.g., for an object in the left visual field, the left edge of the
object is represented as “further left” than the right edge of the
object, which is represented as “left but closer to the midline.”
These retinocentric coordinates are subsequently transformed
into “object-left” and “object-right.” This is consistent with a
mental shifting of the object to the ego-center, at which point
the remapped (mentally shifted) “left” and “right” in object-based
coordinates match the egocentric left and right.
Note that this suggests that allocentric reference frames are
derived from egocentric reference frames, and are thus not
at the same level in the computational hierarchy, i.e., object-
based locations are not a primitive parameter in allocentric
spatial processing in the same way egocentric locations constitute
a primitive in egocentric spatial processing (Klatzky, 1998).
This suggests that regardless of what level (which layers, or
projections between layers in a multi-layer network) egocentric
and allocentric computations take place at, the egocentric
coordinates need computed first before being fed into a
network that can construct object-based representations. The
feasibility of transforming egocentric representations into object-
directed responses using a basis function network that lacks
explicit object-centered representations and whose neurons
have retinotopic response fields, has been demonstrated by
Deneve and Pouget (2003). Object-referenced actions emerge as
mappings between the relative and absolute retinal locations of
an object and particular motor commands—at no point in the
network do such cells, or does the network, create an explicit
object-centered spatial representation.
Even if a bottom-up transformation of egocentric to object-
centered coordinates is possible, the rule-like behavior of some of
these parietal neurons, and extensive training required to exhibit
object-centered responses, however, also suggest a top-down
modulatory signal. As with area SEF, this leads to the prediction
of an earlier prefrontal than posterior parietal response. This
prediction has in fact been tested. A recent study using
simultaneous recordings in macaque prefrontal and posterior
parietal cortex showed that rule-based spatial categorization
signals are stronger and emerge earlier in dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex than in area 7a (Goodwin et al., 2012). Monkeys were
trained to categorize dots as either “left” or “right,” or “above,”
or “below” a boundary in response to a rule cue. Thus, the same
dot location could be classified as left or right, or as above or
below, depending on the rule cue. Both parietal and prefrontal
neurons represented spatial categories according to the rule, but
with earlier and stronger rule-dependent modulation of category
signals in prefrontal cortex, suggesting executive control over
spatial processing.
This suggests the possibility that a number of object-relative
responses found in area 7a and SEF are likely rule-dependent
spatial responses, rather than spatial perception or representations
of spatial relations between objects in a bottom-up manner, and
explains why these object-relative responses (which likely depend
on mental transformations of ego-centered responses) require a
lot of training.
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Finally, it should also be noted that, in contrast to object-
based modulations of eye movement planning in SEF (Olson,
2003), posterior parietal area LIP, which is also involved in eye
movement planning, did not show object-centered coding of
saccade targets (Sabes et al., 2002). It is possible that this is
due to the fact that the stimuli used by Sabes et al. involved
the rotation of an irregular, asymmetric shape, in contrast to
stimuli that can be mentally translated left or right to match the
ego center. Another prediction therefore is that object-centered
effects might disappear if rotations of more complex, asymmetric
objects were employed, which make the mental transformation
back to egocentric coordinates more difficult.
Outside parietal and frontal areas, medial superior temporal
(MST) neurons have been reported to signal target motion
independent of eye or head movements, possibly in a world-
centered reference frame (Ilg et al., 2004). However, Sereno and
Sereno (1991) have shown that position-independent, MST-like
motion selectivity responses can develop in third-layer units
of a feedforward network despite position-dependent direction
selectivity within their receptive fields.
Chafee and Crowe (2012) distinguish between first-order (e.g.,
sensorimotor signals tightly coupled to stimuli or movements,
in an egocentric frame of reference), second-order (signals
are still dependent on e.g., egocentric position and movement
parameters, but can be modulated by cognitive factors, such as
attention, working memory, delayed planning), and third-order
(complete sensorimotor independence both temporally and
spatially) signals. The neurophysiology evidence on object-based
spatial representations reviewed here is consistent with a highly
abstract, cognitive signal. While it is debatable to what extent this
abstract signal is independent of ego-relative parameters, it seems
clear that these are high-level, cognitive signals that are likely
“trained into the brain” (Chafee and Crowe, 2012).
FMRI STUDIES: BRAIN ACTIVATIONS FOR
EGOCENTRIC VS. ALLOCENTRIC TASKS
While single-unit recordings are restricted to small numbers of
brain regions, can neuroimaging reveal additional brain networks
subserving allocentric spatial representations? Numerous fMRI
studies have attempted to identify the neural substrates of
allocentric and egocentric spatial processing (for reviews, see
Galati et al., 2010; Boccia et al., 2014).
Despite the wide variety of tasks (and definitions) employed
to probe allocentric spatial cognition, most studies fall into three
broad categories: (1) spatial judgment tasks, e.g., tasks requiring
subjects to report left/right locations relative to egocentric or
object-centered coordinates (e.g., Galati et al., 2000; Neggers
et al., 2006, similar to Figure 4B); or requiring spatial proximity
or alignment judgments between two objects or objects and the
ego (e.g., Saj et al., 2014); (2) spatial navigation tasks (virtual,
imagined, or remembered; e.g., Committeri et al., 2004; Zhang
and Ekstrom, 2013); and (3) allocentrically-guided movements,
e.g., pointing or reaching to spatial targets relative to another
object vs. relative to the ego (e.g., Thaler andGoodale, 2011; Chen
et al., 2014).
In general, both egocentric and allocentric tasks have been
reported to activate overlapping parieto-frontal networks, with
generally greater egocentric than allocentric activations in
superior parietal and superior frontal cortex, especially in the
right hemisphere (Galati et al., 2000, 2010; Committeri et al.,
2004; Neggers et al., 2006; Zhang and Ekstrom, 2013; Chen et al.,
2014; Saj et al., 2014). Additional foci of greater egocentric than
allocentric activation have been reported in superior or middle
temporal gyrus (Neggers et al., 2006).
Note that despite evidence of overlapping parieto-frontal
activations for both allocentric and egocentric tasks, no object-
centered topographic maps have been found in parieto-frontal
areas, across multiple attempts (Sereno et al., 2009), in contrast
to well-established retinotopic or face-centered maps in parietal
and prefrontal cortex (Hagler et al., 2007; Filimon, 2010; Sereno
and Huang, 2014).
Allocentric tasks induce greater fMRI activations than
egocentric tasks in temporal lobe structures and occipital regions,
including the lingual gyrus (Galati et al., 2000; Committeri et al.,
2004; Neggers et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2014); inferior temporal
gyrus (Committeri et al., 2004; Zaehle et al., 2007; Saj et al., 2014);
and hippocampus (Galati et al., 2000; Zaehle et al., 2007). Other
fMRI studies have reported increased functional connectivity
between the hippocampus, the superior parietal cortex, and
precuneus in allocentric tasks (Zhang and Ekstrom, 2013).
Thus, despite the overlap between egocentric and allocentric
task activations, allocentric tasks rely more on ventral occipito-
temporal networks, whereas egocentric tasks activate parieto-
frontal networks more strongly (for an exception to the latter
pattern, see Thaler and Goodale (2011) as well as Zaehle et al.,
2007).
While this pattern is consistent with the idea of functionally
and partially anatomically separate neural processes underlying
allocentric and egocentric spatial cognition, here I examine
whether different activation patterns (and ventral visual stream
activations in particular) provide evidence for a separate
allocentric spatial reference frame. I will argue that the different
patterns of activation are task- and strategy-dependent, where
the egocentric spatial frame is relied upon to varying degrees in
combination with non-spatial object-recognition processes.
Regarding spatial judgment tasks, at first glance, the greater
parieto-frontal activation for egocentric tasks reported by most
studies appears puzzling. If allocentric processing involves
mentally shifting or rotating objects to the egocentric midline,
such that an object’s left and right are concordant with the
egocentric left and right, wouldn’t this imply greater activation
for allocentric than egocentric tasks, at least in posterior parietal
cortex, due to allocentric tasks in fact relying on additional
ego-relative processing?
In fact, such a pattern of greater parietal activation for
allocentric tasks has been reported, and appears to depend on the
nature of the task. Zaehle et al. (2007) for instance, used verbal
descriptions of spatial relations instead of actual visual images. In
the allocentric condition, subjects listened to descriptions of the
location of geometric shapes (triangles, circles, squares) relative
to each other (e.g., shape A was to the left of shape B, B was above
C, shape C was to the right of D). Subjects were then asked to
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infer the spatial relationship between two shapes whose spatial
relationship to each other had not been described, but could be
inferred from the other objects (e.g., where D was relative to
A). In the egocentric condition, spatial locations of objects were
described relative to the body as well as relative to other objects
(e.g., shape A is to your right; shape B is to the right of shape A),
but subjects had to infer the spatial relationship of a target object
relative to themselves (e.g., whether shape B was to their right).
Zaehle et al. (2007) found that, although both egocentric and
allocentric conditions activated parieto-frontal regions, inferior
temporal gyrus, and occipital areas, the allocentric condition
led to greater activation than the egocentric condition in the
right superior and inferior parietal lobule, the right superior and
inferior frontal gyrus, the ventrolateral occipito-temporal cortex
(inferior temporal gyrus), and the hippocampus.
These results are consistent with mental imagery of the
different visual shapes. However, notice that here, both the
egocentric and the allocentric conditions invoke mental imagery.
The greater right parietal activations for the allocentric condition
could be due to the additional effort of translating object-relative
spatial locations of each object into egocentric coordinates,
whereas in the egocentric condition, this relationship is already
described. The allocentric task can be solved equally by keeping
track of each object’s location relative to oneself, and comparing
the egocentric location of shape A and that of shape D. As argued
in previous sections, it is possible to solve this type of problem in
purely egocentric terms.
Why then have other studies reported the reverse pattern of
greater parieto-frontal activations for egocentric than allocentric
conditions? One possible reason is that in contrast to Zaehle
et al.’s study, where both the egocentric and the allocentric
conditions required mental imagery, most other fMRI studies
use visual stimuli (e.g., Galati et al., 2000; Neggers et al., 2006).
Spatial judgments based on actual egocentric visual stimulation
may lead to stronger activations than spatial judgments based on
imagined object translations back to the ego center in allocentric
conditions.
For instance, Galati et al. (2000) and Neggers et al. (2006)
both used a horizontal bar intersected by vertical lines at
various positions relative to the bar midpoint. The horizontal
bar was also displayed at various horizontal positions relative
to the ego-center. In the allocentric condition, subjects had
to report whether the vertical line was left or right of the
horizontal bar midpoint, regardless of its egocentric position.
In the egocentric condition, subjects reported whether the
vertical line was to the left or right of their body midline. Both
studies found stronger right posterior parietal activations for the
egocentric condition compared to the allocentric task. Moreover,
allocentric activations were much weaker overall, with neither
study reporting significantly greater allocentric than egocentric
activations. In Galati et al. (2000), there was a trend for greater
medial occipital and hippocampal activation in the allocentric
compared to egocentric condition, which however did not reach
statistical significance. Both of these studies are consistent with
more robust activation of posterior parietal cortex when the
egocentric spatial location is presented visually rather than
mentally imagined. Alternatively, it is possible that establishing
the egocentric “body midline” may require greater effort due to
less precise proprioceptive mechanisms, compared to estimating
simple retinal distances in the allocentric condition, thus leading
to greater activation in the egocentric condition. Similar results
were also obtained by Saj et al. (2014), who used vertical
alignment judgments between two shapes vs. between one shape
and the egocentric midline, as allocentric and egocentric tasks,
respectively. This task can also be solved in purely egocentric
terms, by calculating the retinocentric vector from the fovea to
each shape. If one vector is longer than the other, clearly the
two shapes are not aligned with each other. Similar to other
studies, Saj et al. also obtained stronger right posterior parietal
activations for the egocentric compared to the allocentric task,
and greater allocentric than egocentric activation in left inferior
temporal cortex.
Other fMRI studies have compared egocentric vs. allocentric
tasks in spatial navigation ormore complex virtual environments.
Committeri et al. (2004) used snapshots of a virtual environment
taken from different points of view, representing a central square
with a fountain and a three-winged palace surrounding it.
Inside the courtyard, two target objects and a reference object
were displayed at different spatial distances to each other, to
the central wing of the palace, and to the subject. Subjects had
to decide which of the two target objects was closer to them
(viewer-centered condition), which was closer to the reference
object (object-centered condition), and which was closest to the
central wing of the palace (landmark-centered condition). Note
that each of these conditions is equally solvable in egocentric
terms: during training, subjects learn view-specific layouts of the
environment, together with where the central wing is relative to
them, in each scene. Hence deciding which target object is closer
to the central wing of the palace (landmark condition) could be
solved by first establishing whether the central wing is on the
egocentric right or left, and which of the two target objects is
more right or left, in egocentric terms. Deciding which of two
target objects is closer to a reference object (object-centered
condition) likewise involves estimating which retinal distance
between two points (target 1 and reference object, or target 2
and reference object) is shorter, together with depth and size
cues of objects that are nearer or farther. In contrast to the
other conditions, the landmark condition additionally requires
retrieval of different (viewpoint-dependent) scene views from
memory. All three conditions activated posterior parietal cortex.
The main differences consisted of a bilateral ventro-lateral
occipito-temporal activation (inferior temporal gyrus) present
only in the object-centered condition, and medial occipito-
temporal (fusiform, lingual gyrus and parahippocampal cortex)
activations in the landmark condition (which relied on scene
recognition).
Thus, the ventral visual stream activations are consistent
with representations of visual distances (similar to Saj et al.,
2014, where the retinal distance between two objects had to be
estimated in the allocentric task). This is also consistent with
patient D.F.’s deficits discussed in the Neuropsychology Section
above. The medial occipito-temporal activations are consistent
with view-dependent scene recognition. While allocentric
spatial frames independent of the viewer’s perspective could be
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postulated, the alternative egocentric explanations are at least as
likely.
Also supporting the interpretation that directly perceived
egocentric coordinates activate spatial networks more than ego-
relative mental transformations, Zhang and Ekstrom (2013)
found that a simple control condition of just navigating to a
visible target led to as much, if not more, activation as various
imagined mental transformations necessary for navigating from
one landmark to the next, in retrosplenial cortex, precuneus,
parahippocampus, and superior parietal cortex. This is consistent
with Bennett’s (1996) hypothesis that animals navigate most
efficiently based on recognized landmarks by moving toward
them, rather than by using cognitive maps of ego-independent
allocentric spatial relationships between landmarks.
Moreover, Huang and Sereno (2013) recently showed that the
mental navigation network, which includes retrosplenial cortex,
posterior parietal, premotor, precuneus, parahippocampal, and
occipital regions, largely overlaps with retinotopic, and hence
egocentric, maps. In fact, they suggest that this bottom-
up retinotopic organization helps encode scene and location
information in an eye-centered reference frame for use in top-
down, mentally simulated navigation.
The greater reliance on ventral visual or temporal lobe
activations in some allocentric tasks could thus be interpreted
as tasks that place greater memory or mental navigation
demands—but nevertheless from an egocentric perspective,
e.g., remembering sequences of landmarks from an egocentric
perspective.
Finally, other fMRI studies have investigated the use of
allocentric and egocentric frames of reference in the context
of planning and executing movements toward remembered or
remapped targets (Thaler and Goodale, 2011; Chen et al., 2014).
Although a shift from dorsal to ventral visual regions has been
proposed for immediate vs. delayed movements, respectively,
both dorsal and ventral visual stream areas are re-activated at the
time of delayedmovements, with greater reliance on ventral areas
in the case of delayed grasping compared to pointing, presumably
because detailed visual information about object size and shape
needs re-activated (Singhal et al., 2013).
In a study by Chen et al. (2014) differently colored horizontal
dots indicated the fixation point, target, and allocentric
landmarks. The fixation dot appeared first, followed by a target
together with a landmark cue, at various horizontal eccentricities.
The target and landmark then disappeared, and the fixation
point was shifted to the center. Following a 12 s delay, the
landmark reappeared either at the same or different location
and an auditory reach instruction was given. In the egocentric
conditions, subjects either reached to the remembered egocentric
location of the target (pro-reach), or to the opposite location of
the egocentric target (anti-reach). In the allocentric condition,
subjects reached to the remembered location of the target relative
to the allocentric landmark (i.e., if the landmark had shifted, the
implied reach target shifted with it). In control trials, subjects
reported the color of the target.
During the delay, the exact location of the future reach target
could not be predicted, since the allocentric landmark could re-
appear at novel locations relative to the fixation point. Similarly,
the egocentric target location could be revealed as either
the remembered location or the opposite location (although
in principle subjects could be maintaining two simultaneous
egocentric target locations in working memory). However,
since targets and landmarks consisted of differently colored
dots subjects could presumably rehearse the target-landmark
configuration as a unit, akin to an object configuration, in
the allocentric condition (e.g., a red and blue dot for target
left, landmark right, respectively). As argued previously, this
configuration remains dependent on how this arrangement
appeared from the ego perspective (see Figure 1 and Section
Theoretical Considerations).
As expected, Chen et al. (2014) found that during the delay,
both egocentric and allocentric target encoding activated parietal
and premotor areas. However, egocentric encoding of target
position activated the posterior parietal lobe and PMd (dorsal
premotor cortex) more strongly than the allocentric target
encoding condition. Conversely, during the delay, the allocentric
condition led to greater activation in the lingual gyrus, cuneus,
and calcarine, i.e., all visual areas. Note that this is consistent
with a spatial encoding in the egocentric condition, but a more
visual configuration, similar to object processing, in the allocentric
condition.
Thus there obviously is an effect of “allocentric” cues—
however, it is debatable whether this should be interpreted as
an allocentric spatial reference frame effect rather than a ventral
visual stream, object configuration or object processing effect,
where multiple visual stimuli are treated as a unit (c.f. Logothetis,
2000).
Effects of “target left of the allocentric landmark” vs. “target
right of the allocentric landmark” during the delay were also
constrained to the ventral visual pathway, namely the inferior
temporal gyrus and inferior occipital gyrus (Chen et al., 2014).
This is also consistent with a retinotopic representation of an
object, with egocentrically more left vs. more right locations
activating object processing areas that contain retinotopic visual
maps (Huang and Sereno, 2013).
Although Thaler and Goodale (2011) found the opposite
pattern (allo > ego in parieto-frontal circuits) for cursor
movements to allocentrically-defined targets, the delay and
movement planning phases were not separated, and allocentric
targets could have been immediately converted to egocentric
coordinates from the beginning.
In summary, fMRI studies have generally shown a pattern of
overlapping activations in parieto-frontal regions for allocentric
and egocentric tasks, which can presumably be explained by
the common translation of both “egocentric” and “allocentric”
targets into ego-relative coordinates. Additionally, regions
specific to allocentric spatial judgment tasks overlap with
ventral visual areas involved in object and object configuration
processing. Allocentric tasks that involve mental navigation
between different landmarks presumably involve additional
mental transformations of the ego into different imagined
orientations, hence activating hippocampal and related (e.g.,
retrosplenial) regions that encode or store multiple view-
dependent scene representations during navigation. Although
the activation patterns for egocentric and allocentric tasks
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are partly distinct, they do not unequivocally support the
existence of allocentric spatial reference frames, and could
thus be reinterpreted using egocentric reference frames
alone.
CONCLUSIONS AND PREDICTIONS
The evidence reviewed here, spanning behavioral, neuronal,
neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies, suggests that
allocentric spatial representations may not be independent
of egocentric coordinates, whether for navigation, spatial
perception, or target-directed movements. Both empirical
evidence and theoretical considerations suggest that spatial
mechanisms relying only on egocentric reference frames cannot
be ruled out. Egocentric explanations for allocentric effects have
been proposed before (e.g., Bennett, 1996; Mozer, 1999; Driver
and Pouget, 2000; Wang and Spelke, 2002; Deneve and Pouget,
2003; Rorden et al., 2012). This review has attempted to unify
a wide variety of findings from multiple fields of investigation,
and to show how egocentric mechanisms could account for
allocentric task effects in multiple domains.
Not all spatial judgments rely on the immediate (present)
egocentric perspective, but can involve mental transformations
such as imagined rotations and translations of the ego or of
objects (ego-relative coordinates). Moreover, abstract rules can be
built upon ego-relative spatial representations, as discussed in the
Neurophysiology Section. Similarly, for recognition of landmarks
to be possible from multiple viewpoints, viewpoint-invariance
needs to be established.
This suggests a hierarchy of representations, including
parieto-frontal egocentric spatial representations and ego-
relative remapping, landmark and object recognition in the
ventral visual stream, path integration in hippocampal and
related structures, and categorical rule representation involving
prefrontal networks. While these networks undoubtedly work
together to solve the many complex spatial tasks that animals
face, the key argument made here is that bottom-up spatial
representations are fundamentally ego-dependent.
What criteria could be used to evaluate whether an allocentric
spatial reference frame is used? Some possible criteria include:
1. Controlling for egocentric confounds, by varying the spatial
location of objects not only relative to the eyes and head, for
example, but also the body or any other possible egocentric
reference frame (hand, foot, etc.). An object-centered spatial
reference framewould be suggested if a cell’s response does not
depend on the object’s spatial relationship to any body part.
2. To rule out learning of rule-based categorization, allocentric
response fields tied to an object or part of an object should
be present without extensive training, similar to egocentric
receptive fields.
3. To identify whether cells encode configurations of object
features holistically or conversely relative to each other in
allocentric coordinates, a cell representing feature A relative
to feature B in the object should continue to signal that
spatial relationship if different parts of the object are removed.
Similarly, if in a scene object A is represented relative to object
B, moving object B should shift the allocentric response field
tied to that object, such that a cell should respond to object A
at the new, updated allocentric location, even if other objects
in the scene have not moved.
Other specific testable predictions include:
(1) At the behavioral level:
- the improved spatial localization accuracy when presenting
spatial targets relative to landmarks should disappear if the
allocentric landmark is an irregular shape that is rotated
between initial and post-delay presentations. Conversely, if
the target is encoded in an object-centered reference frame,
rotation of the landmark should have no effect on accuracies
(or on reaction times), since the allocentric relationship
should be independent of the egocentric perspective.
(2) At the neuropsychological level:
- hemineglect patients would be expected to show no object-
based neglect for novel objects that are radially symmetric
or which lack an intrinsic longitudinal axis that could be
mentally rotated upright to match an egocentric, viewpoint-
dependent representation of such an object. Instead, the
egocentrically-defined contralesional half of such unfamiliar
objects would be expected to be ignored in any orientation.
The lack of a canonical upright orientation for such objects
predicts that mental rotations should not take place for these
objects.
- object-based neglect will vary as a function of encoding vs.
retrieval, and familiarity with an object. In other words,
object-centered neglect should appear for novel objects
experienced in a particular orientation over and over
again, as a view-dependent mental representation becomes
established over time.
(3) At the neural and neuroimaging level:
- brain activity for object-based spatial decisions should be
slower than for egocentric spatial decisions (note that
behavioral reaction times may not be sensitive enough to
detect such temporal delays). EEG or MEG, or event-related
fMRI and effective connectivity, could establish the time
courses of different brain networks during “allocentric” and
“egocentric” tasks. Egocentric decisions should show an
earlier temporal profile compared to allocentric decisions,
at least in parieto-frontal networks associated with space
perception. Rule-based spatial decision making should
activate prefrontal decision making regions such as DLPFC
(Filimon et al., 2013) earlier than parieto-frontal spatial
networks.
- the fMRI literature suggests that parietal (or parieto-frontal)
activations should generally be stronger for seen, rather
than imagined, spatial relations. Stronger activations for
visual observation than imagery, or for visible compared
to invisible reaching, have indeed been reported in the
posterior intraparietal sulcus and high-level visual areas
(Filimon et al., 2007, 2009, 2015).
However, the more difficult the (allo-to-ego) mental
transformation required for an allocentric stimulus (e.g.,
mental rotations, etc.), the stronger the activation should be.
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The current review demonstrates several difficulties and
challenges in teasing apart allocentric spatial reference frames,
non-spatial mechanisms, and egocentric representations. The
examples given here illustrate that it is possible to explain
a wide variety of allocentric task effects using egocentric
spatial reference frames. The interpretation offered here is of
course only one possible interpretation, and it is certainly
possible to refer to object recognition as “allocentric” if what
is meant by that is the ability to categorize multiple viewpoints
as the same object. However, this is not necessarily an
agreed-upon definition. Future studies could test the specific
predictions made by the egocentric account and control for
alternative non-spatial explanations. A clear and consistent
definition of the term allocentric will be a key step in this
direction.
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